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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
MARVIN PETERSEN and BEVERLY 
PETERSEN, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
-vs-
VOYL MECHAM, 




STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action by the plaintlffs, Marvin Peter-
sen c-1nd Beverly Petersen, for rescision of a warranty 
deed and reconveyance of realty situated in the State 
of Wyoming, which was given to the defendant-
appellant in exchange for an interest in seller's pro-
ceeds from a contract for sale of property in Idaho, 
based upon certain misrepresentations alleged to 
have been made by the appellant in order to induce 
the respondents to enter into the exchange. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the Co·urt sitting without 
a. jury, and plaintiffs were awarded judgment, can-
celling· and rescinding a contract entered into by the 
plaintiffs and defendant, rescinding a warranty 
deed given by the plaintiffs to the defendant, and an 
order was entered against the defendant to recon-
vey the land in question to the plaintiffs. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant appeals from the judgment and 
decree of the lower court on the ground that the 
record does not support the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law entered therein. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or prior to October 1, 1962, Marvin Petersen 
and Beverly Petersen, his wife {plaintiffs herein) 
entered into a Listing Agreement with one Glen 
Van Tasse·ll who was acting as salesman for Duffin 
Realty Company, wherein the Petersons authorized 
Van Tassell to secure a purchaser of their ranch 
property situated in Wyoming. At the same time, 
Voyl Mecham (defendant herein) was the contract 
purchaser of a motel situated in Arco, Idaho. 
Sometime prior to December 15, 1962, defendant 
Mecham entered into a Listing Agreement with Duf-
fjn Realty, which authorized Duffin Realty to secure 
o. purchaser of his interest in the motel property in 
Arco, Idaho. Thereafter, Glen Van Tassell, acting as 
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salesman for Duffin Realty produced a buyer for 
the motel owned by defendant Mecham, and on De-
cember 15, 1962 defendant Mecham signed an agree-
ment with one Zola B. Beebe, wherein Mrs. Beebe 
agreed to purchase the said motel. This agreement 
was introduced in evidence as Exhibit P-1 (R 36). 
Pursuant to the terms of this agreement Mrs. Beebe 
agreed to buy Mecham's equity in the said motel in 
the amount of $46,096.92, which was payable at the 
r1te of $300.00 per month, together with interest 
thereon at the rate of 5% per annum, commencing 
February 1, 1963. Thereafter, five days later, on 
December 20, 1962, through the efforts of the same 
Glen Van Tassell, plaintiffs Marvin and Beverly 
Petersen and defendant Voyl Mecham entered into 
an agreement (which was introduced in evidence 
as Exhibit P-3 (R 40) pursuant to the terms of which 
defendant Mecham conveyed to the Petersens 
59.38% of his eauity jn the agreement of sale with 
Mrs. Zola B. Beebe (Exhibit P-1) in exchange for the 
conveyance of the Petersens' interest in the ranch 
nroperty situated in the State of \t\T-yoming, which 
the parties agreed was worth $27,373.32. 
The agreement between Mr. and Mrs. Petersen 
and Mr. Mecham specified that a copy of the Beebe 
contract was attached thereto and that Mecham was 
assigning to the Petersens 59.38% thereof, together 
with the same percentage of the monthly payments 
due from Mrs. Beebe, without recourse against 
Mecham in the event of default by Mrs. Beebe. 
In paragraph 6 of the same agreement, Mr. and 
~.~rs. Petersen agreed to hold Mr. Mecham harmless 
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from th.e default by Zola B. Beebe vf the terms of her 
agreement of purchase (R 44). 
Thereafter, Mrs. Beebe defaulted in her pay-
ments required to be made under contract (Exhibit 
P-1) and on April 8, 1963, Mr. and Mrs. Petersen 
commenced action for recision of the agreement en-
tered into between Mr. and Mrs. Petersen and Mr. 
Mecham and for re-conveyance of the Wyoming 
rancl1 property which had been conveyed to Mr. 
Mecham. 
At the triaL Mr. and Mrs. Petersen appeared 
and testified that Van Tassell had represented to 
them that the motel was earning an average of $3,-
000.00 per month. They further testified that Van 
Tassell represented to them that he was personally 
acquainted with Mrs. Beebe (R 76, 88, 89, 90), that 
she was an honest woman, an able motel manager, 
and that she would make the payments to the Peter-
sens (R 88). Mrs. Petersen further testified that she 
and her husband made no effort to check the credit 
or character of Mrs. Beebe (R 88). 
Plaintiffs also produced as a witness Glen Van 
TasselL the salesman who had arranged all of the 
foregoing transactions. He testified, among other 
things, that Mecham had represented to him that 
the motel "had made him $3000.00 per month and 
that he had books to prove it" (R 32, 33). At the re-
quest of Van Tassell, Mr. Mecham delivered his 
books on the operation of the Arco motel to Mr. 
Van Tassell. These records were subsequently in-
troduced in evidence as Exhibit D-6 (R 105). The 
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office girl at the Duffin Realty Company transcribed 
these records, and her typed copy was introduced 
in evidence as Exhibit P-4 (R 44 and R 94). 
Mr. Mecham also appeared as a witness in his 
own behalf and among other things denied that 
he h~d represented to Mr. Van Tassell or anyone 
else that the motel had an income of $3,000 per 
month. He said, "I told him at one time it took in as 
mucr! as, a little over $3,000.00 in one month" (R 78). 
The uncontroverted evidence also indicates that 
Van Tassell was instrumental in procuring the 
breach of contract by Mrs. Zola B. Beebe (R 104). 
The evidence further shows that, subsequent to 
the breach of the agreement to purchase the motel 
in Area, Idaho, by Mrs. Beebe, the holders of under-
lying liens on the motel proceeded to foreclose their 
claims against the motel by repossession (R 104) and 
that the Petersens refused to contribute the sums 
necessary to save the motel, although Mr. Petersen 
admitted that he knew that he should have stood to-
qether with Mr. Mecham to protect Mecham's equity 
in th~ motel but that failed he to do so (R 7 4). 
At the time of the trial hereof the motel in Idaho 
had been repossessed and the interest of both 
Petersen and Mecham had been lost thereby. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT E'RRED IN FINDING 
"THAT TO INDUCE THE PLAINTIFFS TO ENTER 
INTO SAID WRITTEN AGREEMENT THE DEFEN-
DANT REPRESENTED [TO PLAINTIFFS] THAT 
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DURING THE PERIOD OF TIME HE HAD OPERAT-
ED THE MOTEL HE HAD MADE AN AVERAGE NET 
INCOME OF $3,000.00 PER MONTH: THAT THIS 
REPRESENTATION WAS A MATERIAL REPRESEN-
TATION." 
POINT· II: THE TRIAL COURT FURTHER ERRED 
Il'J FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFFS .WERE 
READY, WILLING AND ABLE TO CANCEL AND 
TERMINATE THE AGREEMENT BY AND BETWEEN 
THE PARTIES. 
POINT III: THE UNCONTROVERTED TESTIMONY 
BY THE PLAINTIFFS SHOWS THAT THEY EN-
TERED INTO THE CONTRACT WITH THE DE-
FENDANT BECAUSE OF THE REPRESENTATIONS 
BY VAN TASSELL WITH RESPEC1' TO MRS. BEEBE 
A.ND NOT BECAUSE OF THE REPRESENTATIONS 
AS TO INCOME. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING 
"THA 1~ TO INDUCE THE PLAINTIFFS TO ENTER 
INTO SAID WRITTEN AGREEMENT THE DEFEN-
DANT REPRESENTED [TO PLAINTIFFS] THAT 
DURING THE PERIOD OF TIME HE HAD OPERAT-
ED THE MOTEL HE HAD MADE AN AVERAGE NET 
INCOME OF $3,000.00 PER MONTH: THAT THIS 
REPRESENTATION WAS A MATERIAL REPRESEN-
TATION.~' 
Defendant submits that the Court erred in Find-
ing of Fact No. 3 in two particulars: 
1) In finding that defendant made any representa-
tions at all to plaintiffs; and 
2) In finding that the alleged misrepresentation 
was material. 
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These points will be argued in the above order. 
1. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT DE-
FENDANT MADE ANY MISREPRESENTATIONS AT 
ALL TO PLAINTIFFS-In the Findings of Fact signed 
by the Court, Finding No. 3 contains a finding that 
" ... defendant represented that during the period 
of time he had operated the motel he had made an 
average net income of $3,000.00 per month .... " 
(R 15). This finding is vague as to whom defendant 
made this alleged representation; however, in the 
Memorandum Decision filed by the trial court in 
this m.atter, which was later amplified by the Find-
ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the trial judge 
clearly specified to whom he found the alleged mis-
representations were made. The Memorandum De-
cision says in part: 
"1. That it appears from the clear and convincing 
evidence that the defendant HIMSELF made rep-
resentations TO THE PLAINTIF'F'S and to others 
which were false .... " (R 14). (Emphasis added.) 
The Memorandum Decision further states: 
". . . Whether Van Tassell himself made any false 
representations, or was an agent of one or the other 
or both of the parties, would have no bearing in this 
case" (R 14). 
Defendant respectfully submits that the Court's 
finding that defendant HIMSELF made the alleged 
representations TO PLAINTIFFS, finds no support 
in the evidence. The clear and uncontroverted testi-
mony, even of plaintiffs themselves, was to the con-
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trary. Mr. Petersen testifie-d that he did not have any 
dealings with Mr. Mecham, nor did he talk with 
Mr. Mecham as to the earnings of the motel (R 65), 
and both plaintiffs admitted that they had not even 
met Mr. Mecham until after their contract with him 
was sig-ned (R 74). Thus, it is clear from the record 
that the defendant himself did not in fact make any 
representations to the plaintiffs. 
Defendant concurs with the findings of the trial 
court that whether or not Van Tassell made any false 
representations would have no bearing in this case. 
This appears from the fact that Van Tassell was the 
listing agent for both parties, and thus, his represen-
tations are not chargeable to the defendant any 
more than they are chargeable to plaintiffs. 
2. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
THE ALLEGED MISREPRESENTATION WAS MA-
TERIAL - Defendant, in his testimony and con-
tinu_ously since the inception of this matter, has de-
nied tha_t he made any representation to anyone that 
the rnotel h-3d an average net income of $3,000.00 
per month. Since this is a suit in equity, the court 
has the d.uty to review both questions of law and 
fact. RUBEY vs. WOOD, 13 Utah 2d 285, 373 P.2d 
386 (1962). Ne-vertheless, even conceding, for the 
sake of the argument and without admitting that 
defendant did make such a representation, de-
fen.dant asserts that the representation was not ac-
tionable since it was not material to the subject of 
the contract which plaintiffs seek to rescind. It 
should be borne in mind that plaintiffs were no1 
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purchasing an interest in the motel in Area, Idaho, 
nor were they purchasing an interest in the income 
from the motel. The contracts which were intro-
duced in evidence clearly indicate that on Decem-
ber 15, 1962 defendant sold the motel to MRS. ZOLA 
BEEBE and that five days later on December 20, 1962, 
nlaintiffs purchased part of defendant's interest in 
the Beebe contract. Thus the plaintiffs acquired no 
interest in the motel or its income, but only an ac-
count r2~eivable from Mrs. Zola Beebe. The contract 
between plaintiffs and defendant specifies that the 
plajntiffs were buying 59.38% of Mecham's "equity 
in the attached agreement of purchase." The Beebe 
contra.ct was attached to the agreement between 
nl ~in tiffs and defendant and by its terms indicated 
that the only thing moving to the seller thereunder 
(defendant Mecham) was the right to receive $300.00 
Der month from 11rs. Zola Beebe. Accordingly, the 
propert}7 purchased by plaintiffs was merely a por-
:~on of the defendant's interest in the contract be-
t\veen defendant and Mrs. Beebe, and not the motel 
or its income. 
One of the fundamental principles of the law 
relating to misrepresentation and the maintenance 
o£ actions based thereon is, that in order to be ac-
tionable the facts misrepresented_ must have been 
r::aterial facts. These facts must substantially affect 
the interest of the persons asserting the misrepresen-
t:::t:.:)r-,. From the facts of this case it will readily be 
seen that no facts were misrepresented or even 
nlleged to be misrepresented_ with respect to the 
Eeebe contra.ct, which was the only thing in which 
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plaintiffs purchased an interest. "In order to fall 
within the requisites of materiality essential to predi-
cation of fraud on their existence/ representations 
must be RELEVANT TO THE SUBJECT OF A CON-
TRACT and must be as to some SUBJECT MATERIAL 
TO THE CONTRACT ITSELF, as distinguished from 
matters which are merely collateral thereto and do 
not constituJe essential elements thereof. FOR EX-
AMPLE/ IT Hi\S BEEN I-IELD THAT REPRESENTA-
TIONS WHICH MERELY AFFECT THE PROBABIL-
ITY THAT THE CONTRACT WILL BE PERFORMED 
ARE COLL.A_TERAL TO IT AND DO NOT CONSTI-
TUTE ACTIONABLE FRAUD." (23 Am. Jur. 1 Fraud 
and Deceit/ Section 113) Emphasis added.) 
Defendant respectfully submits that the state-
ments alleged to have been misrepresented were 
representations as to collateral matters (the income 
of the motel during the six months it was operated 
by J\1echam) a.nd were not material to the subject 
matter of the contract between plaintiffs and de-
fendant (the payments to be received from the Beebe 
contract). 
It is submitted that inasmuch as plaintiffs were 
purchasing only the right to receive $178.14 per 
month from Zola Beebe, the real .3ubject of inquiry 
by plaintiffs should be the character of Zola Beebe 
and her disposition for paying her debts. Yet the 
re':ord shows, from the admissions of plaintiffs them-
selves .. that plaintiffs made no attempt to investigate 
Zola Beebe and that they relied upon the representa-
tions of Van Tassell that HE WAS PERSONALLY 
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ACQUAINTED WITH MRS. BEEBE, THAT SHE WAS 
AN HONEST WOMAN, AN ABLE MOTEL MAN-
AGER, AND THAT SHE WOULD MAKE THE PAY-
MENTS TO THE PETERSENS (R 88). There is no 
hint in the record that any of these representations 
were made with the knowledge or approval of de-
fendant. In fact, the uncontroverted testimony also 
shows that defendant was was not personally ac-
quainted with Zola Beebe and did not know her 
character himself (R 89, 90). 
It should also be noted that the precise fact al-
leged to be misrepresented was that while DE-
FENDANT operated the motel HE made an average 
net income of $3,000.00 per month. This would 
have no bearing on whatever income might be de-
rived from the motel BY ZOLA BEEBE. Inasmuch 
as the contract documents (Exhibits P-1 and P-3) on 
their face indicated that Mrs. Beebe had purchased 
the motel from Mr. Mecham only five (5) days prior 
to the time that plaintiffs purchased their interest in 
the Beebe Contract from Mr. Mecham, plaintiffs 
were charged with the knowledge that Mrs. Beebe 
was a new operator of this motel and they would 
have no right to rely on any representations made to 
therrl with respect to the operation of the motel by 
defendant or anyone else, other than Mrs. Zola 
Beebe. 
In the case of LEWIS v. WHITE, 2 Utah 2d 101, 
269 P.2d 865 (1 954), this court held: 
"No matter how naive or inexperienced the de-
fendants were, they could not close their eyes and 
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accept unquestioningly any representations made to 
them. IT WAS THEIR DUTY TO MAKE SUCH 
INVESTIGATION AND INQUIRY as reasonable 
care under the circumstances would dictate. . . ." 
(Emphasis added). 
Yet the record clearly indicates that plaintiffs 
made no attempt to investigate the one element of 
importance to them/ which was Van Tassell/s repre-
sentation that Mrs. Beebe was a good motel opera-
tor/ an honest woman/ and that she would pay the 
Petersens. 
POINT :II THE TRIAL COURT FURTHER ERRED 
IN FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFFS WERE 
RE:ADY, VviLLING AND ABLE TO ·CANCEL AND 
TERlVIINATE THE AGREE.ME.NT BY AND BETWEEN 
THE P ARTIE:S. 
There is no evidence in the record to support 
that portion of Finding of Fact No. 3 which states 
that //the plaintiffs of all times have been ready/ will-
ing and able to cancel and terminate said written 
agreement by and between the parties/ terminating 
anv interest they may have acquired therein and 
RETTJRNING THE SAME TO DEFENDANT/I (R 16). 
(Emphasis added_.) In fact/ the record shows that the 
Petersens did not attempt to protect the interest they 
had acquired from Mecham in the Beebe Contract 
and simply let it go. Thus/ the Petersens had noth-
ing to return to Mecham/ and the trial court was in 
error for including this in Finding of Fact No. 3. 
Petersen admitted that he knew that they should 
stand togehter to protect Mecham's equity in the 
moteL but failed to do. (R 74). Under general prin-
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cipals of equity he who seeks equity must do 
equi~y. In a suit for rescission of a completed con-
tract, plaintiff must restore defendant to his status 
quo. The uncontroverted evidence shows plaintiffs 
failed to protect the interest they should have re-
stored to defendant, and consequently were not in 
the position to do equity by their ovvn default. Ac-
cordingly the court should have denied plaintiffs' 
petihon for rescission. 
POINT III: THE UNCONTROVERTED TESTIMONY 
BY THE PLAINTIFFS SHOWS THAT THEY EN-
TERED INTO THE CONTRACT WITH THE DE-
FENDANT BECAUSE OF THE REPRESENTATIONS 
BY VAN T ASSE.LL WIT I-I RESPECT TO MRS. BEEBE 
AND NOT BE.CA.USE OF THE REPRESENTATIONS 
AS TO INCOME. 
Notwithstanding any representations made to 
the Petersens with respect to the income of the 
motel while Mecham operated it, the record· shows 
thcJ the real basis for the Petersens' entering into 
the contract was the representation by Van Tassell 
to the Petersens as to the character of Mrs. Zola 
Beebe and her ability to operate and manage the 
motel in a profitable manner. Mr. Van Tassell had 
been negotiating v.rith the Petersens for two months 
cr mere to get them to buy the motel (R 73, 88). It 
was at this time that the alleged representations as 
to the income were made to them. Yet they did not 
buy the motel. Thereafter, Zola Beebe bought the 
r::otel, and Mrs. Petersen testified that Van Tassell 
made representations to them of his prior acquaint-
ance with Mrs. Beebe, together with her ability and 
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honesty, whereupon the Petersens bought an in-
terest in the Beebe Contract. Thus it clearly appears 
that the fact which motivated the Petersens to "deal" 
was Van Tassell's representations about Zola Beebe, 
and not about the income of the motel. In fact Mrs. 
Petersen admitted this in so many words in the fol-
lowillg testimony (R 89): 
"Q. He [Van Tassell] did assure you you would be 
paid by Mrs. Beebe every month? 
"A. I guess he did, or we wouldn't have signed it." 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully submits that essential 
elements of the trial court's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law are contrary to the evidence, 
are not supported by any competence evidenced 
and, therefore, the judgment in favor of the plaintiffs 
should be reversed in favor of the defendant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
TUFT, MARSHALL AND DIBBLE 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
53 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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